Hume on practical reasoning (Treatise 463-469) by Millgram, Elijah
Contents
235 E l i j a h  M i l l g r a m
Hume on Practical Reasoning (Treatise 463-469)
267 O h a d  N a c h t o m y
Wittgenstein on Forming Concepts and Seeing Aspects
293 Yossi Y o n a h
Patriotism, Alienation, and Well-Being: Rousseau on
Political Legitimacy
327 J a m e s  B. S t e e v e s
Authenticity and Falling in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time
Book Reviews
? .? ?  J .  S t e r n  /  E . Benor, Worship of the Heart: A Study of 
Maimonides’ Philosophy of Religion
345 Book Received
347 Summaries of Hebrew A rticles
Elijah Millgram
Hume on Practical Reasoning
(Treatise 463-469)*
The claim that “ ‘is’ does not entail ‘ought’ ” is so closely associated with 
Hume that it has been called ‘Hume’s Law’ .1 The interpretation of the 
passage in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature that is the locus classicus of 
the claim is controversial. But the passage is preceded by three main bodies 
of argument, and, on the working assumption that the passage in question is 
closely connected to the argumentation that leads up to it, I will here 
examine the third of these, running from T 463:7 to 469:18.2
While interpretations have differed from one another, they have agreed in 
attributing to Hume uncharacteristically weak arguments.31 propose to show
* Thanks to Annette Baier, Alyssa Bernstein, Hilary Bok, Lindy Cassidy, Cora 
Diamond, Steve Engstrom, Don Garrett, Hillel Millgram, Robert Nozick, Hilary 
Putnam, G eoff Sayre-McCord, Tim Scanlon, Candace Vogler, and Margaret W ilson, 
who read and commented on earlier drafts o f this paper. I’m also grateful to Sanford 
Shieh for helpful discussion, and to an audience at Brown University for questions 
and objections.
1 Hare 1963, 108.
2 Hume 1888/1978 and Hume 1777/1978 will be cited by T and E, respectively, 
follow ed by page number, and, where this is useful, line numbers; T 5 :6 -8  would  
refer to Hume 1888/1978, page 5, lines 6 -8 . The ‘is-ought’ passage is at T 469. The 
first stretch o f the preceding argument (T 457:6-459:10) recapitulates points made 
at T 4 1 3 -4 1 7 , and cannot be adequately discussed without considering those 
passages as well; limitations o f space prevent me from doing that here. The second  
(T 459:11-463:2) deploys considerations that are morality-specific, and are for this 
reason also best treated separately.
3 I w ill discuss som e of these interpretations in the text and footnotes below. For 
now, w e may note that my assessment of the reconstructed arguments as weak is 
typically shared by the commentators who have advanced those reconstructions. 
Stroud, for example, wraps up his account o f the arguments I will consider in 
sections 3 and 4, below, by remarking that “[i]t need hardly be said that this
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that Hume’s arguments are both stronger and more interesting than has been 
allowed. But— I will argue— they exploit and consequently depend upon a 
semantic theory that contemporary philosophers are no longer able to accept.
Hume must be assigned a good deal of the responsibility for making “ ‘is’ 
does not entail ‘ought’” part of philosophers’ (and not just philosophers’) 
commonsense. If I am right both about Hume’s influence and about the 
presuppositions of his arguments, then the interest of these conclusions is not 
merely historical. Today Hume’s Law is a philosophical near-truism, and the 
burden of proof is taken to rest squarely on the shoulders of its opponents. 
But if Hume’s Law is inherited from Hume, and was originally accepted on 
the basis of arguments that we can no longer find acceptable, this may require 
a reassessment of just where the burden of proof may be presumed to lie.
I
It will be helpful to have a rough outline of Hume’s semantic theory in front 
of us, and I will accordingly begin by summarizing it and indicating some of 
its consequences. If mental items (perceptions, in Hume’s terminology) have 
contents these must come from somewhere. Hume looks for their source 
and finds it in a surprisingly familiar place: to determine the content of a 
mental item, follow the causal chain it terminates back to its origin. “Ideas,” 
says Hume, “always represent the objects or impressions, from which they 
are deriv’d.”4 An idea derives its content from the idea(s) or impression(s)
argument is not completely decisive,” attributing the arguments’ not fully spelled- 
out shortcomings to “the vagueness and imprecision of the views Hume is arguing 
against”— and to “unjustifiable restrictions on what is demonstrable” (1977, 175f). 
Fogelin ends up describing the arguments in question as “embarrassingly weak” 
(1985, 127). Harrison states that “[n]ot only does Hume’s proof o f the conclusion 
that morality is not susceptible o f demonstration fa il...;  his conclusion is also false, 
and rather obviously false at that” (1976, 49).
4 T 37:29-31. “’[T]is impossible perfectly to understand any idea, without tracing 
it up to its origin, and examining that primary impression, from which it arises” 
(74:36-75:1; 83:11-29 could be construed as involving an extremely long chain of 
this kind). Abstract ideas are trickier but are treated by Hume as derivative from the 
straightforward case: T 17ff, esp. 17:17-20; 20:9-13; 22:11-24; 24:24-26; 34:30-35.
The causal analysis o f  reference may seem  to sit uncomfortably with Hume’s 
subsequent discussions o f causation and external objects. 1 do not think this 
difficulty can be explained away, say, by som ehow combining the accounts— I think
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that caused it, and impressions derive their contents (when they have any) 
from whatever caused them. Thus my idea of golden mountains is about 
golden mountains in virtue of being derived from ideas of gold and of 
mountains; and these are about gold and mountains because (let us suppose) 
at some time or other I have had impressions of gold and of mountains from 
which these ideas are derived. To be sure, causation itself is not enough: my 
mental entities are not about all the things that caused them. In modern 
theories, this difficulty is usually met by incantations of the phrase, “causal 
chain of the appropriate type”; Hume’s way of addressing this 
problem—determining that resemblance must be added to causation to 
transfer content— has, at any rate, the merit of being more substantial than 
contemporary alternatives.5 We can label this part of his view the causal 
resemblance theory of mental content.6
that they really are  incompatible. And I do not think that Hume was unaware o f this: 
in fact, I suspect that eliciting such incom patibilities was part o f Hume’s 
philosophical project (the part that justifies calling Hume a skeptic). (For discussion 
o f one such incompatibility, see Garrett 1981.) Discussion of these issues lies 
beyond the scope o f this paper; for the present, I w ill adopt the expository policy o f  
treating items given non-standard or skeptical analyses in one argument as, 
nonetheless, meant to be thought of in an ordinary, unanalyzed way in others, unless 
appeal to those analyses is made specifically. (See note 6 below.)
5 To see that these are distinct conditions, notice that Hume states that “[s]econdary, 
or reflective impressions are such as proceed from  [i.e., are caused by] ...original 
ones” (T 275:16f, my emphasis). Here we have impressions caused by others they 
do not resemble, and whose content they do not assume.
6 Notice that if, contrary to the policy adopted in note 4, one were to attempt to 
com bine the causal resemblance theory with Hume’s account o f external objects 
(roughly, there are no external objects, and if there were, impressions could not 
resemble them), one would have to adopt a view on which impressions o f sensation 
had no representational content; on such a view, representational content could be had 
only by ideas. (One would then have to choose between saying that impressions have 
no contents at all, or saying that there is a thinner, non-representational notion of 
content exhausted by the merely intrinsic qualities o f impressions. One would also 
have to assume the exegetical task of reading away references to objects in passages 
like the one just quoted (T 37:29-31).) Since I wish for the purposes o f this paper to 
remain agnostic on this point, I will for simplicity o f exposition continue to speak of  
external objects as the possible sources o f contents o f  ideas and impressions; but I 
intend m y discussion to be compatible, mutatis mutandis, with a reading of Hume of  
this more exotic variety. (I’m grateful to Cora Diamond for pressing me on this point.)
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At least part of the account I have just given should be familiar under the 
name ‘the theory of ideas’. My description is intended to bring into focus the 
following point. The ‘theory of ideas’ is usually thought of as a doctrine in 
what we would today call philosophy of mind; and so the temptation is to 
blame aspects of Hume’s views that are derived from it on an outmoded 
empirical psychology. But Hume’s philosophical psychology is, like our 
own, hardly empirical at all. He does not discover what the contents of the 
mind are by, say, cutting open heads and looking. Rather, like contemporary 
philosophers of mind, he derives his theory of the mind from his theory of 
representation; just as contemporary philosophers, who take content to be 
borne by propositions, find the mind to be stocked with prepositional 
attitudes, so Hume, who takes content to be borne by resemblance, finds the 
mind stocked with impressions and ideas. The explanatory account is 
semantic, not psychological: it is a view about how, and under what 
conditions, representation is possible.
The causal resemblance theory of content has two important consequences 
corresponding, more or less, to the two conditions it imposes on 
representation. First, because we may not have examined the resemblance- 
preserving chain that is responsible for an idea having the content it does, we 
may be in error as to what the contents of our ideas are. (Hume accordingly 
devotes much of the Treatise to establishing what the contents of our ideas 
are in philosophically important cases.) An idea can be simple or complex. 
If complex, its content is determined by the way its structure relates simple 
ideas. If an idea is simple, its content is determined by the impressions and 
objects it derives from and resembles. It follows that one can establish the 
content of an idea by analyzing its structure, if it is complex, and by tracing 
the relevant chains of resemblance-preserving causation back to their 
origins. In doing so, one can discover what it really was that one was 
thinking about when one entertained and used an idea—a surprising claim, 
since it might turn out that what one was actually thinking about was not at 
all what one took oneself to be thinking about.7 In the next section I will
7 Mackie (1980, 58) is unable to believe that Hume was willing to endorse this
conclusion, and construes Hume “as intending to say that this is what you ought to 
mean, because that is all that, on reflection, you could maintain.” Stroud also finds 
this unlikely (1977, 180f), as does Hudson (1968, 297); and Fogelin has his qualms 
as well (1985 ,137). But see E 62:8-63:5, esp. 62:21-25, and, on a slightly different
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examine two instances of this use of the causal resemblance theory.
A second consequence of the theory is to be found in Hume’s 
understanding of mathematical reasoning, i.e., deduction or demonstration.8 
Hume’s theory of content is, indirectly, a theory of what contents of thought 
are possible: if content is borne by resemblance, thoughts can have only 
those contents for which resemblance can be responsible. Contents must be, 
roughly, pictures of what they represent. (‘Roughly’, because we have other 
modalities of perception than the visual; we hear, taste, smell, and feel. So 
not all ideas are literally pictorial.) Because thought is the mental 
manipulation of contents, Hume’s understanding of thinking in general, and 
deductive thinking in particular, is shaped and constrained by his pictorial 
theory of content, just as ours is presumably shaped and constrained by our 
prepositional theory of content. That is, since in Hume’s view all reasoning 
consists in the manipulation of ideas, which Hume tends to think of as 
something like mental pictures, deductive reasoning must be reconstructed as
but related point, T 23:14-18; 33:9-18 (esp. 15-18). Hume also thinks that we can 
use names with no idea of what we are naming; this is a risky practice, and following 
the procedure for determining what the content o f an idea is may actually establish 
that some of our words are meaningless: E 74:14-20; 78:2-4; T 61:36-62:1; 
compare T 162:20-25; 168:7-29; 224:6-14. Even if  textual evidence seems to show  
that Hume held this view, isn’t it too outlandish to be attributed to him charitably? 
Is it Hume’s view that, for example, I could really be thinking about a can o f cat food  
when I think I’m thinking about my Form 1040? (I’m grateful to Felicia Ackerman 
for the example, and for pressing the objection.) To see that Hume has ways of 
handling this kind of case, recall the role o f resemblance in controlling reference. 
How are we to imagine such a case? Suppose w e have a mental picture that (we  
would say) qualitatively resembles a Form 1040, but is causally connected to a can 
o f  cat food. In this case, the content of the picture cannot be the can o f cat food 
because it fails to resemble  the can of cat food. Suppose we substitute for this picture 
one that qualitatively resembles a can o f cat food; now there is no trouble in seeing 
that it is a picture of the cat food, but it is implausible that I should mistake this 
picture for a picture o f my Form 1040. (Dan Brock has suggested that the problem 
might be kept in play by considering a chain o f partial resemblances. I’m not sure 
what the Humean response would be here, but I doubt that Hume considered this 
problem himself.)
8 The closest contemporary rendering of “demonstration” is “deduction,” and 
treating these as synonyms is a helpful reminder that they play analogous roles in 
their respective philosophical environments. However, it is important to remember 
that the fit is not precise.
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the manipulation of (roughly) mental pictures.9 The general shape of Hume’s 
pictorial view of deductive arguments is nicely rendered by Harrison:10
two and two are four— an a priori necessary truth, discoverable by reason— can be 
known to be true by comparing our idea of, say, two spots and another idea o f two 
spots, and seeing that they must be equal in number to our idea o f  four spots.11
We should bear in mind that in Hume’s day the foremost deductive science 
was geometry, in which the reasoning was explicitly pictorial.12 And, of 
course, the deductive techniques codified by Frege were not available to
9 In this context, ignoring mental contents that are not visual images is not 
unreasonable. It can be at least at first glance sensible to imagine deductive thought 
as done with pictures; but it would be another matter entirely to conceive of 
deduction as performed with, say, olfactory sensations.
10 Harrison 1976, viii. Harrison’s view o f the upshot (p. 34) is that “since [Hume] 
confuses propositions with ideas or mental images, he confuses entailment, which is 
a relation between propositions, with relations such as resemblance between mental 
im ages.” This parochial and tendentious statement o f an important point is worth 
lephiasing: Since Hume has a different understanding of thought than we do (one not 
necessarily more confused than our own), he has an appropriately different 
understanding of deductive inference. I have not yet come across an adequate 
treatment o f this subject, which I can only touch on in this paper.
11 I don’t mean to suggest that one would choose this example if one wanted to 
explore Hume’s views o f demonstration in greater depth; while it illustrates the way 
in which demonstration must be pictorial, it may not be helpful when considering 
other features o f demonstration. For instance, its very simplicity makes it at best a 
borderline case; since the relation of equality is “discoverable at first sight, [it] fall[s] 
more properly under the province o f intuition than demonstration” (T 70:9f).
12 It might be objected that Hume finds arithmetic and algebra more precise than 
geometry, and that we should consider them, rather than geometry, ‘foremost’ for 
Hume. Moreover, since Hume imputed the ‘defects’ o f  geometry to the fact that its 
“original and fundamental principles are deriv’d merely from appearances” (T 
71:30-32), we might conclude that algebra and arithmetic owe their “perfect 
exactness and certainty” to their non-pictorial nature. I won’t try for a judgment call 
on which of the mathematical sciences was Hume’s favorite; note, however, the 
amount o f discussion which geometry receives in the Treatise, as opposed to 
arithmetic or algebra. (Cf. also T  181 f.) And as to whether Hume considered algebra 
to be at bottom non-pictorial: he reiterates, on the following page, “that principle so 
oft insisted on, that all our ideas are copy’d from our impressions" (72:32f); it 
follows that arithmetic and algebra are unlikely to be exceptions.
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show how propositionally oriented forms of deduction could be powerful 
tools of inference— something the syllogistic was most definitely not. So 
Hume’s thinking of deduction as something done with pictures was not 
nearly as far-fetched as it would be today. In sections 3-4 we will see how 
Hume’s discussion of the view that morality is a demonstrative science was 
controlled by his pictorial understanding of deductive argument.
II
The stated aim of the stretch of argument we are examining is to show that 
beliefs about what ought and ought not to be done— about ‘the boundaries 
of right and wrong’— cannot be arrived at by reasoning. Later I will say a 
little about the role of this claim in Hume’s larger argument. For now, we need 
only note that the considerations Hume allows himself in these arguments are 
not morality-specific, and so do not apply only to beliefs containing a ‘moral 
ought’. (I will call the beliefs with which Hume is concerned ‘deontic beliefs’; 
I mean the term to cover beliefs naturally expressed using a ‘should’ or an 
‘ought’ whether or not they contain a ‘moral ought’.)
The argumentation is organized by a familiar dilemma:13
If the thought and understanding were alone capable o f  fixing the boundaries o f right 
and wrong, the character o f virtuous and vicious either must lie in som e relations o f  
objects, or must be a matter o f fact, which is discovered by our reasoning. (T 463)
The two tines of Hume’s standard fork are subsidiary arguments to the effect 
that moral beliefs (or more generally, deontic beliefs, that is, judgments of 
what ought to be done) cannot be the conclusions of deductive reasoning 
(reasoning about relations of objects), and that they cannot be the conclusions
13 Actually, the dilemma here is not entirely familiar, since Hume has substituted 
‘relations o f objects’ for ‘relations o f ideas’. I take it that he chose this way of putting 
the point partly in view o f opponents’ views that moral facts can be discerned in 
relations o f  objects (the locution being the opponents’ rather than Hume’s: cf. 
M ackie 1980, ch. 2). Since perceptions o f  objects w ill represent whatever relations 
are to be found among the represented objects, it does not much matter for Hume 
whether he is considering relations o f objects or relations of ideas. (Cf. T 456f: “All 
these systems concur in the opinion, that morality, like truth, is discern’d merely by 
ideas, and by their juxta-position and comparison.” See also T 20: I f  and T  29:3-6.) 
Nonetheless, as w e’ll see, the emphasis on relations o f objects turns out to be a 
pointer to the way the argument actually works.
242 Elijah Millgram
of what we can call empirical or experimental reasoning (reasoning about 
matters of fact). I will treat the second tine first; it runs as follows:
Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all 
lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call 
vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, 
volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely 
escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You can never find it, till you turn 
your reflexion into your own breast. (T 468f)
Now on a first reading, this argument should seem to beg the question. Why 
not say that you do perceive the vice?14 It seems unlikely that an opponent 
will agree that he does not perceive it in the imagined situation. To see why 
Hume thinks that this claim is legitimate we must bring to bear his semantic 
theory. If I judge some state of affairs to be virtuous or vicious, I must have 
an idea of vice or virtue. What is the content of this idea? Hume’s way of 
addressing this question is to invoke what I am calling the causal 
resemblance theory of mental content.
There are similar applications of this technique elsewhere in the Treatise, 
and it will be useful to first consider one of these: Hume’s treatment of 
necessity is suitably explicit. He asks:
What is our idea of necessity when we say that two objects are necessarily connected 
together. (T 155, italics Hume’s)
We make judgments to the effect that two objects are, or are not, necessarily 
connected. What is the content of the idea of necessary connection? Hume 
turns to the causal chain of ideas and impressions from which the idea in 
question is derived:
Upon this head I repeat what I have often had occasion to observe, that as we have 
no idea, that is not deriv’d from an impression, we must find some impression, that 
gives rise to this idea of necessity, if we assert we have really such an idea. (T 155)
Hume considers the two objects that we might have thought were the other 
end of the causal chain, and concludes that the impression of necessary 
connection is not derived from them. One reason for this may be a picture of
14 See Mackie 1980, 53f, or Harrison 1976, 63, for something like this objection.
Harrison says elsewhere that “[t]his is mere assertion, and Hume is guilty of
appealing more to rhetoric than to argument” (p. 61). Stroud makes a related point
as well (1977, 179f).
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the physical mechanisms that mediate sensation and the information they are 
able to convey; light carries information about the colors and (perhaps) the 
spatial dispositions of objects, but not about necessitation.15 Hume also has 
a further argument. The derivation must not be merely causal: the derived 
idea or impression must resemble its cause. So we need to examine the 
putative cause to see whether we can find an aspect of it that resembles the 
idea under consideration. Hume says:
I turn my eye to two objects suppos’d to be plac’d in that relation; and examine them 
in all the situations, of which they are susceptible.
He immediately discovers the spatial relation of contiguity and the temporal 
relation of succession, both of which have their correlates in his ideas; but 
no feature resembling the full force of necessary connection is apparent in 
the objects, since a similar-Zoofa'ng pair of objects could prove to be only 
coincidentally connected.16 So the objects cannot be the source of the entire 
content of the idea.
The content of the idea of necessary connection must derive from 
something in the circumstances in which the judgment of necessary 
connection is made: if not from an external impression, then from an internal 
one.17 Examining the surrounding circumstances reveals that the repeated 
observation found to give rise to such judgments
produces a new impression, and by that means the idea, which I at present examine. 
For after a frequent repetition, I find, that upon the appearance of one of the objects, 
the mind is determin’d by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it 
in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object. ’Tis this impression, 
then, or determination, which affords me the idea of necessity. (T 155f)
Tho’ the several resembling instances, which give rise to the idea of power, have no 
influence on each other, and can never produce any new quality in the object, which
15 T 34:6-9: “my senses convey to me only the impressions of colour’d points, 
dispos’d in a certain manner.” Cf. also E 63:13-15 and T 56:23-27. In any case, as 
Steve Engstrom has reminded me, the realization that modal facts are not directly 
perceptible predates Hume.
16 The claim should be distinguished from the separate point that no proof can be 
given that two distinct objects are necessarily connected. That very different 
argument would be the structural analogue of arguments we will consider below. Cf. 
E 63:33-64:7.
17 Cf. E 64:8-12.
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can be the model of that idea, yet the observation of this resemblance produces a new 
impression in the mind, which is its real model.18
Notice the role played by resemblance in this account—over and above that 
of the resemblance between instances of causally interacting objects that 
Hume mentions in the just-quoted passage. While the mental impression 
from which our ideas of causation are derived is itself caused by the objects 
we naively take the idea to be about, semantic content is only transferred 
between resembling links of the causal chain. The impression of 
determination does not resemble the external objects, so, even though it is 
caused by them, it does not derive its content from them; consequently, the 
impression of determination terminates the semantic chain. In short, 
applying Hume’s semantic views shows the content of our idea of necessity 
to be (in part) derived from an impression of reflexion rather than the 
‘necessarily connected’ objects themselves. It follows from this that 
necessary connection is not any matter of fact about the objects, and so that 
empirical reasoning about the objects will not establish their necessary 
connection.
The reasoning is similar, albeit more terse, in Hume’s discussion of the 
case of wilful murder. We make moral judgments, such as those regarding 
virtue and vice.19 What are the contents of the ideas involved in those 
judgments? The content of an idea (of, say, vice) must be derived, directly 
or indirectly, from some impression. Can this content be derived from 
impressions of vicious events? On considering a vicious event (wilful 
murder), Hume decides that it cannot. As in the argument about necessary 
connection, Hume’s view is probably shaped in part by a conception of the 
mechanisms involved in sensation: sound and light convey information 
about, for example, color, but not, at any rate in the same way, about vice.20 
More importantly, a derived idea must resemble its cause. What, in the 
murder, resembles the idea of vice, with its felt repugnance, motivating
18 T 164f, emphasis Hume’s. Cf. also E 75:19-24; 78:10-18.
19 Or more generally, judgments that play the role in action that moral judgments 
play in moral action; the argument is more general than morality.
20 This is of course not to say that vice is, on Hume’s view, in the object but causally
ineffective with respect to our sense organs. At this point in the argument, however,
this possibility has not yet been ruled out. The claim that vice is not in the object is 
the conclusion of the argument.
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power, and disapproval? Quite evidently, nothing. But when “you turn your 
reflexion into your own breast, [you] find a sentiment of disapprobation, 
which arises in you, towards this action” (T 468f). This sentiment does 
possess the requisite felt qualities, and must therefore be the source of the 
idea’s content. Notice again the role played by resemblance in terminating 
the causal chain with the “sentiment of disapprobation” rather than with the 
non-resembling event acknowledged to have caused the sentiment. The 
murder causes the sentiment, but since the sentiment does not resemble the 
murder, the sentiment does not derive its content from the murder; and 
consequently ideas that derive their content from the sentiment cannot be 
thereby deriving their content from the murder itself.
The conclusion is
that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, 
but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame 
from the contemplation of it.21
Since vice is not a matter of fact about the ‘vicious’ object, you cannot 
establish that an object is vicious by experimental reasoning about the 
object. But viciousness, recall, was just an example of a moral (or deontic) 
fact. Generalizing, the conclusion of the argument is that moral (or deontic) 
facts cannot be established by experimental reasoning that is solely about the 
objects that are the putative subject-matter of those facts.
Now we might wish to resist Hume’s analysis on the grounds that the 
‘sentiment of disapprobation’ cannot possibly capture the full force of the 
idea of vice. (In what way, we might ask, does disapprobation resemble 
vice?) It is clear enough what Hume thinks the feeling supplies: if part of the 
idea of vice is that it is (something like) repulsive, that can be accounted for 
by appealing to an actual feeling of revulsion.22 The problem here is that if 
‘disapprobation’ is something on the order of a feeling of revulsion in the pit
21 T 469:4—8, my italics. Notice that this is not a skeptical conclusion—that there is 
no such thing as, say, vice—but the hard-won result of semantic analysis, which 
does not dispose of the concept of vice, but rather tells us just what it is a concept of. 
Hume’s skepticism lies elsewhere.
22 Thinking of the surplus content as repulsiveness may be too strong. Hume tends 
to describe the feeling as ‘uneasiness’ (e.g., T 499:25-28; 471:5-9); at one point he 
suggests that it can be distinguished from other kinds of uneasiness, but does not say 
much about its “peculiar” qualities (T 472).
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of one’s stomach, it will not have the richness needed to reconstruct the 
cognitive role of the idea of vice; but if, on the other hand, it is sufficiently 
complex— if it is disapprobation— then it will have too much cognitive 
content to be construed as derived from an impression of reflection, that is, 
from something on the order of a feeling of revulsion in the pit of one’s 
stomach. These problems are a good place to dig in one’s heels; however, for 
our present exegetical purposes, we need only consider whether they should 
give rise to second thoughts about our reconstruction of Hume’s argument. 
And here parity considerations settle the issue. It is just as implausible that a 
feeling of determination could account for whatever content the idea of 
necessity has over and above constant conjunction. (How does a feeling of 
determination— perhaps something, as James might have thought, like a 
tension in the upper chest— resemble necessity?) But Hume’s treatment of 
necessity is given at much greater length, and it is clear that he accepts just 
this analysis. So we should not be surprised that he accepts a similar analysis 
in the case of vice as well.
Ill
We have just finished reconstructing one horn of a dilemma. If moral or 
deontic beliefs can be arrived at by reasoning, they must be arrived at either 
by experimental reasoning or by deductive reasoning. We have seen Hume’s 
argument that they cannot be arrived at by experimental reasoning. Hume 
presents two further arguments to the effect that they cannot be arrived at 
deductively, or, in his language, cannot consist in ‘relations of objects’. 
These arguments are intertwined in the text, and commentators often fail to 
distinguish between them.
The first argument in the anti-deductivist horn of Hume’s dilemma aims 
at showing that the relations of objects that a moral or deontic fact would 
consist in cannot even be specified. (If they cannot be specified, “thought 
and understanding” cannot be “alone capable of fixing [their] boundaries” 
(463).) Since much of this argument has been adequately discussed, I will, 
in surveying those parts of it that have, provide just enough detail to frame 
the part that has not. Hume first points out that these relations have never 
actually been specified (T 463:25ff); this fact puts the burden of proof 
squarely on the shoulders of his opponent. (Hume remarks, “’[t]is impossible 
to refute a system, which has never yet been explain’d” (T 464:15f).)
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Moreover, he insists that the relations in which deontic facts allegedly 
consist must be specified in terms of the four relations of “[r]esemblance, 
contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity and number” (T 
464:4f, italics deleted); and it is (he will argue in a moment) very unlikely 
that deontic facts could be specified using only these relations. This 
restriction is not as question-begging as it might sound.23 First, Hume claims, 
no one has ever proposed any other relation to play this role (T 464:10-15). 
And second, recall that these relations are supposed to play a role in 
deductions or demonstrations, and that Hume’s understanding of deduction 
is pictorial. Since deductive reasoning is to be reconstructed as the 
manipulation of mental pictures, the relations in question must be the kind 
of relations that can be used in a deduction, pictorially conducted: that is, in 
a deduction that proceeds in roughly the manner of the proofs of Euclidean 
geometry. This explains why it is reasonable to restrict the allowable 
relations to the four Hume mentions; and even if he has overlooked one or 
two, it is implausible that relations relevantly similar to these could suffice 
to specify the moral or deontic facts.
Hume supports the implausibility claim with an argument:
As moral good and evil belofig only to the actions of the mind, and are deriv’d from 
our situation with regard to external objects, the relations, from which these moral 
distinctions arise, must lie only betwixt internal actions, and external objects. (T 
464:21^-65: l )24
But it is very unlikely that the allowable relations will suffice to rule in all 
the situations of moral import while ruling out those to which morality is 
irrelevant. Hume supports the point with a well-known illustration:
To put the affair, therefore, to this trial, let us chuse any inanimate object, such as an 
oak or elm; and let us suppose, that by the dropping of its seed, it produces a sapling
23 For variations on this complaint, see Harrison 1976, 48, Fogelin 1985, 135, and 
Stroud 1977, 175f.
24 It might be thought that this argument is morality-specific, and does not settle the 
question with respect to deontic facts more generally. But this would be to 
misconstrue the intent of the argument. Moral facts are a subset of deontic facts; 
from a moral argument one concludes that one ought to do such-and-such, just as one 
might conclude, from a prudential argument, that one ought to do something else. If 
moral facts cannot be specified in terms of available relations, this will suffice to 
show that not all deontic facts can be so specified.
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below it, which springing up by degrees, at last overtops and destroys the parent tree: 
I ask, if  in this instance there be wanting any relation, which is discoverable in 
parricide or ingratitude? (T 467:2-8)
There are obvious differences between oaks and persons, and between their 
respective relations; but the problem is to capture these differences in terms 
of the allowable relations, those that could plausibly play a role in pictorially 
executed deductions. Hume is quite right to think that it is unlikely that they 
can be captured in this way; once again, if Hume’s opponent claims that 
moral (or more generally, deontic) facts can be specified in terms of relations 
of ideas, the burden of proof is squarely on him.
But burden of proof arguments, no matter how plausible, are not decisive. 
After all, perhaps some very complicated, not at all obvious way of combining 
relations of the allowable kinds will allow one to distinguish situations in 
which morality has a purchase from those in which it does not. Hume 
accordingly concludes his argument against the specifiability of the moral 
relations with a circularity argument that “deserves to be weigh’d, as being, in 
[his] opinion, entirely decisive” (T 468:19f). The circularity argument, 
running from T 467:24 to 468:20, purports to show that it is not merely 
unlikely tliai llie requisite specifications be produced: it is in fact impossible.
The circularity argument invokes a further fact (presented as an 
opponent’s objection) about what such a specification would have to 
express. We know what the relevant difference is between inanimate objects, 
plants, and animals, on the one hand, and persons, on the other: people 
(should) know better:
I would fain ask any one, why incest in the human species is criminal, and why the 
very same action, and the same relations in animals have not the smallest moral 
turpitude and deform ity?...  this action is innocent in animals, because they have not 
reason sufficient to discover its turpitude; but...m an, being endow’d with that 
faculty, which ought to restrain him to his duty, the same action instantly becomes 
criminal to him. (T 467:24—32)
Hume’s reply is that
this is evidently arguing in a circle. For before reason can perceive this turpitude, the 
turpitude must exist; and consequently is independent o f the decisions o f our reason, 
and is their object more properly than their effect. (467:33-36)
Hume’s appeal to circularity here should be puzzling. The problem, it will 
be recalled, is to specify the relevant moral features of situations in a way
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that allows of moral demonstrations or deductions; Hume, then, is claiming 
that such a specification cannot be given because it would be circular. But 
not all circularity is vicious. It is true enough that circularity of a kind may 
be found here: on the proposed view, a moral fact holds of a situation if and 
only if certain ‘relations of objects’ can be found in the situation; one (not 
the only one) of these must be an awareness (or the capability of having an 
awareness) of those relations obtaining.
But why is this any worse than circularities like these? An individual is a 
member of the Rule Club only if he or she knows the rules of the club, and 
these rules contain clauses stating that they apply only to members. One 
might feel proud of, among other things, one’s appropriate pride in oneself; 
and one might even believe that one is not worthy of pride if one does not 
esteem oneself properly. Again, perhaps part of being intelligent is 
recognizing that, and how, one is. There is nothing wrong with these 
circularities; what then is wrong with the similarly circular specification of 
vice?25 To the best of my knowledge, this difficulty has been entirely 
overlooked by Hume’s commentators.
Now in more recent times, philosophical resistance to seemingly 
innocuous circularity has been motivated by features of the technical 
apparatus used to reconstruct representation and reasoning. (I have in mind 
uses of the theory of types; of course, the circularity that motivated the 
theory of types was not itself innocuous.) The possibility of analogy suggests 
that to explain Hume’s circularity argument, it may be once again helpful to 
turn to his semantic views. What requirements, we should ask, do these 
views impose on the reconstruction of the distinction between persons (who 
are aware of the morality-relevant relations in their situations) and animals 
(who are not)?
Content is, on Hume’s view, a matter of (causally controlled) pictorial 
resemblance. For a person to be aware of the relations of objects that make, 
say, a certain moral response appropriate is for that person’s mind to contain 
an idea of those relations: that is, for there to be in his mind an idea that
25 Notice that the circularity in these cases is only partial; there is more to being 
intelligent than thinking that one is, more to the object o f  justified pride than the 
pride itself, and, presumably, more to being a member o f  the club than knowing the 
rules. But vice has the same structure; there is more to being vicious than thinking 
that one is.
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pictorially resembles those relations (and is causally connected to them in 
the appropriate way). Very crudely expressed, being aware of the relevant 
relations of objects involves, among other things, having a picture of those 
relations in your head.26
But what must this picture look like? One of the facts it must picture is 
that you are (or could be27) aware of the relevant relations: this is, Hume 
points out, what is acknowledged to be the relevant difference between 
persons and animals or trees. So the picture must picture the fact that you 
(could) have a picture in your head; and not just any picture, but that very 
picture itself. Now content is, to reiterate, a matter of pictorial resemblance; 
to picture the fact that you have this very picture in your head, the picture 
must contain itself. And of course the smaller, contained picture (since it is 
identical to the larger, containing picture) must contain within itself a still 
smaller copy of itself, and so on, ad infinitum—-much like those pictures on 
the labels of cans that show the can itself, with a picture of the can on the 
label, that shows a still smaller picture of the can... In short, on Hume’s 
semantic views, the circularity turns out to involve an infinite regress within 
the representation of the putative moral fact.28 (Of course, one need not 
crudely think of ideas as literally in the head; and, recall, not all ideas are
26 It must o f course involve other things, if  only because the representation of the 
objects may present you with many more relations between them than the small 
number that now have your attention. But I cannot here discuss Hume’s answer to 
the question: what picks out one represented relation as the object o f my thought?
27 The modal aspect o f  this fact raises difficulties which we shall touch upon later, 
but ignore for now.
28 Annette Baier has pointed out to me that intention is liable to involve a similar 
circularity, and that this will be a problem for Hume. However, the feature of
intention that makes it problematic is specifically its reflexivity: intending to do <f> 
is, in part, intending that that very intention be causally effective in bringing it about 
that one <ps. But as this feature o f intention has come in for attention only recently, 
we may wonder whether Hume saw that there is a problem here. He defines the will 
as “the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give  
rise to any new motion o f our body, or new perception of our mind” (T 399, italics 
deleted). The knowingness is not part o f  the impression that is the will, but is only a 
surrounding circumstance; and whether it is a problem depends on what Hume takes 
it to be a knowingness of. The circularity problem only arises here if  knowingness 
consists in having an idea of, among other things, having that very idea; an idea of, 
for instance, a passion causing an action would be innocuous.
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visual. But the regress remains when these expository conveniences are left 
behind.)
Still, just as not all circularity is vicious, not all regresses are vicious 
either. Why is Hume unable to find this one acceptable? We are going to 
have to speculate, since Hume does not explicitly discuss the matter; but 
there are two considerations that come to mind. The first is simply that such 
a representation is not well-suited to be an element of a pictorially- 
understood deduction. The second, which would be in Hume’s view 
decisive, has to do with what we could call the possible granularity of a 
mental representation. Hume devotes Part II of Book I of the Treatise to 
arguing that our ideas of space and time are not infinitely divisible. Without 
reviewing Hume’s arguments on this point, we can say that Hume’s view 
was that infinitely nested representations of the kind we are considering are 
just not possible, since nesting of this kind would require a kind of infinitely 
fine detail that our ideas cannot have. Hume took this position very 
seriously; this is indicated by both the length and location of his treatment, 
which suggest that Hume saw it as central to his account, and by the fact that, 
on the basis of this claim, Hume was willing to adopt the extremely 
counterintuitive position-that-Euclidean geometry is only approximately 
true.29
Recall our current location in Hume’s move tree. The task of the second 
horn of the dilemma is to show that deontic facts are not demonstrable— that 
morality cannot be thought of as a mathematical science. (It is interesting to 
see how much more time Hume commits to this horn of the dilemma than to 
the other, empirical, horn; we can get some comparative sense from this of 
how live the two options were felt to be in Hume’s day.) We have just seen 
his first argument (or rather, a short series of connected arguments) for that 
conclusion; its (or their) point was that the premises from which a moral 
demonstration would proceed cannot be specified, and that the proofs that 
the mathematical moralist hopes for cannot be so much as begun. This 
argument has been seen to turn on Hume’s pictorial understanding of
29 This brings out an interesting tension in the view I am attributing to Hume. On the 
one hand, I am suggesting, the availability of Euclidean geometry, then the paradigm 
o f  deductive reasoning, made plausible to Hume the thought that demonstrative 
inference could be reconstructed within the pictorialist constraints o f  his semantic 
theory. On the other hand, however, his semantic theory required him to insist that 
Euclidean geometry could not be understood in the standard way.
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representational content. On the one hand, the argument is much tighter than 
commentators have taken it to be; on the other, once we see how it works, it 
becomes clear that this is not an argument that can be appropriated by a 
contemporary moral philosopher.
IV
The horn of the dilemma which argues against the deducibility of deontic 
beliefs contains a second argument (T 465:17-466:11, 15-18), which 
commentators have given particularly bad treatment. Some have simply 
ignored it, some have mistaken it for a part of the previous argument (easy 
to do because they share an illustration), and most have taken it to be a 
hopeless argument for a plausible conclusion.30 
The argument runs as follows:
According to the principles of those who maintain an abstract rational difference 
betwixt moral good and evil, and a natural fitness and unfitness of things, ’tis not 
only suppos’d, that these relations, being eternal and immutable, are the same, when 
considered by every rational creature, but their effects are also suppos’d to be 
necessarily the same. (T 465:18-24)
But
’Tis one thing to know virtue, and another to conform the will to it.. .even in human 
nature no relation can ever alone produce any action; besides this...it has been 
shewn... that there is no connexion of cause and effect... of which we can pretend to 
have any security by the simple consideration of the objects...we cannot prove a 
priori, that these relations, if they really existed and were perceiv’d, wou’d be 
universally forcible and obligatory. (T 465:27-29; 466:1-7, 15-18)
The large structure of the argument is clear: it is a Modus Tollens with two 
premises:
30 Broad, for instance, ignores it, perhaps, one senses, out of embarrassment
(1930/1951, 104-115). Raphael, normally a sympathetic and careful reader, quotes 
the argument in its entirety and then, in a short paragraph, dismisses it as
“depend[ing] on an absurd identification” and “restfing] on a confusion” (1947, 60­
62). Some commentators manage to do more than one of these. Harrison conflates 
this argument with the previous one. He also manages to accuse Hume of begging 
the question, of tautological vacuity, and of vulnerability to the objection that men 
have a “passion for morality”—even though Hume went to great lengths to defend 
this very view, making it hard to believe that this was an objection he had overlooked 
(Harrison 1976, 53ff).
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1. If moral conclusions can be derived through reasoning about relations 
of ideas or objects, then “their effects are... necessarily the same.”
2. The effects are not necessarily the same.
Leaving open for the moment just what these moral conclusions are, just 
what these effects are, and what they are effects of, note that from these 
premises it will follow that moral conclusions cannot be derived through 
reasoning about relations of ideas, or, as we might put it today, that morality 
is not a priori, or analytic, or conceptually true. The difficulty is that it is 
hard to see what Hume might mean by the premises so as to make them 
plausible, and the argument sound.
Now the first premise, that the effects (whatever they are) are necessarily 
the same, need not be Hume’s, since the premise is introduced as how things 
stand “[ajccording to the principles of those who maintain an abstract 
rational difference betwixt moral good and evil” (T 465:18-21). Interpreters 
have accordingly assumed that the argument is merely directed against 
actual opponents who did in fact accept (1). But this view has two 
difficulties. First, as we shall see, the argument would then be directed 
against straw men31—even i f  these particular straw men actually happened 
to exist. (We will see in a moment that it is not plausible to suppose that they 
did.) Second, it would fail to do the work required by Hume’s larger 
argument. In order to show that morality is not established by a priori 
reasoning, it does not suffice to show that people who think it is, and who 
also happen to believe (1), are mistaken. We must, rather, construe Hume as 
arguing that anyone who believes that morality is established by a priori 
reasoning is committed to (1), and therefore is mistaken. Hume’s own 
language supports this point: “[ajccording to the principles of those... ,” he 
says; not ‘according to those... ’.
Why anyone would believe (1) should seem obscure when one considers 
just what the necessarily following effects must be if the argument is to go 
through. Commentators who try to take (1) as explicitly acknowleged by 
Hume’s opponents appeal to the following passage:
31 Mackie 1980 cites Harrison as raising this objection (1976, 53f), and defends 
Hume by “notfing] how big a concession this [i.e., surrendering (1)] would be, and 
how reluctant Clarke, for instance, or Butler would be to make it” (p. 54; see also p. 
57). Compare Fogelin 1985, 127.
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’Tis one thing to know virtue, and another to conform the will to it. In order, 
therefore, to prove, that the measures o f right and wrong are eternal laws, obligatory  
on every rational mind, ’tis not sufficient to shew the relations upon which they are 
founded: W e must also point out the connexion betwixt the relation and the will; and 
must prove that this connexion is so necessary, that in every well-disposed mind, it 
must take place and have its influence. (T 465:27-35)
On the basis of this passage, the effects in question are taken to be 
motivational, i.e., to be an acknowledgement of the action’s obligatoriness 
or an urge to perform the action.32 These effects are taken to be effects of 
doing the demonstrative reasoning. They are supposed to be effects of 
relations of ideas, in a very concrete sense: the ideas are the ideas of the 
agent, and their effects are the choices or intentions or motivations of the 
agent. But this construal is mistaken.
In order for the Modus Tollens to be valid, the effects in question must be 
not merely motivations, but actions, for (2) claims that actions are what do 
not necessarily follow: “no relation can ever alone produce atiy action.” 33
32 1 larrison, for example, attributes to Hume the “premiss that if morality consists in 
relations apprehended by reason, morality must necessarily  move us,” and asks 
whether “there [ is ] ... any reason why th is...  premiss should be true” (1976, 35). 
Mackie takes Hume to be concerned with “[t]he connection between the supposed 
moral relation and choice by any rational agent” (1980, 57, my emphasis).
33 There is a potential ambiguity in this passage: ‘action’ might mean a product o f  
human agency, or merely an event. (If the latter— and this reading could be 
supported by the introductory phrase, “even in human nature”— then an ‘action’ 
might be an instance o f coming to have a motivation, after all.) Hume uses the word 
both ways, and the sense seems to be controlled by context: when he is discussing 
morals, he generally means human action; when he is discussing inert objects, he 
means (roughly) events. Because Hume is here discussing morals, I take it that here 
he means by ‘action’, human action. If this is right, it removes the ambiguity o f the 
earlier phrase, “conform the w ill.” ‘Conforming the w ill’ might be a matter o f good 
intentions, or it might require actually doing  something. But on the former construal, 
pointing out that actions do not necessarily follow would be irrelevant, since one can 
have the best of intentions, yet not act. N ow  suppose I am wrong on this point. As 
we will see below, when we consider Hume’s way o f handling moral theories that 
require not actions but merely good intentions, it turns out not to matter. Once we 
see why ‘effects’ must be ‘necessarily the same’, we will see that even when Hume s 
opponent has a moral theory that does identify some (or even all) ‘effects’ with 
motivations, Hume’s argument will work anyway. But we will also see another 
reason that it is unlikely that Hume has in mind only motivations and not actions.
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And this claim is supported not by any fact specific to human reason or 
motivation, but by appeal to general facts about causation. Now no-one 
should find it plausible that actions necessarily follow upon appreciation of 
an a priori demonstration that some action is right— not even Hume’s 
rational intuitionist opponents. Bluntly put, an agent may be hit over the 
head before he gets a chance to carry out the action. (Recall also that Hume’s 
Christian opponents believed in the possibility of sin, which, on their view, 
involves knowing the right, but not acting on it.) In short, for the argument 
to be valid, the effects must be actions rather than just motivations; the 
principle of charity consequently requires that we refrain from identifying 
the effects of the ‘relations’ as motivations alone, even though it is 
implausible to attribute this view to Hume’s opponents.
There is another reason for thinking that the effects in question should not 
be thought of as motivational, having to do with what I take the function of 
the arguments we have been examining to be. Hume is arguing against 
practical reasoning, against the notion that action can be correct or incorrect 
in the light of reason for or against it. He has already argued that neither the 
action, nor the passion that mediates the transition from theoretical 
conclusion to action, can be mistaken; consequently there is no room for 
describing such transitions as reasoning. This is (part of) the force of his 
earlier claim that reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions.34 
Now suppose that an opponent does not accept this claim, but insists that an 
agent’s action can be rationally required by certain beliefs he holds.35 Hume 
can concede this without conceding that practical reasoning is possible. For 
even if holding a belief can rationally require action, there is still no room for 
practical reasoning unless the belief that compels action can itself be arrived 
at by reasoning. And the purpose of the body of argument that this paper is 
examining is to show that deontic beliefs cannot be arrived at by reasoning.
Hum e’s argument makes the ‘effects’ out to be what his opponent’s moral theory 
requires o f  agents. Now moral theories that require only  meaning well are rather rare: 
most moral theories require agents to actually act, at least in som e circumstances. 
And in these cases, the ‘effects’ will be full-fledged actions, not mere events.
34 T 4 1 5 :1 8 -2 0 ; “ ’tis not the passion, properly speaking, which [can be] 
unreasonable, but the judgement” that it interacts with (416:25-28; compare 459:26­
29). For further discussion o f these passages, see Millgram 1995.
35 A m odem  version of this response can be found in Locke 1982.
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So the argument we are looking at has work to do in Hume’s larger 
argument; and if I am right about its role, then this is the wrong place for 
taking the effects in question to be simply motivational. For Hume has already 
argued that reason does not motivate, and has also argued that because reason 
does not motivate, deontic beliefs cannot be arrived at by reasoning (T 457:6­
458:18). It is now time for him to concede the possibility of motivating 
beliefs, if only for the sake of argument, and show that even if some beliefs 
did motivate, this would not show that there was such a thing as practical 
reasoning. These role-directed considerations favor construing Hume’s 
argument as not depending on the claim that reason does not motivate. On the 
conventional interpretation, however, this is the force of (J).36
The effects, then, are not simply motivations, but actions. But if the 
effects are actions, we have to explain why the proponent of the view that 
relations of ideas ground morality is committed to the claim that the actions 
that follow upon particular relations of ideas must always be the same. To do 
this, we must return to Hume’s semantic theories.
Recall that what the contents of deductively manipulated ideas are must 
be compatible with the causal resemblance theory. And restrictions on what
36 There is yet another reason for resisting the identification of effects with
m otivations. The argument construed as turning on motivations would be 
unsatisfactory, because it would prove too much. The point o f the argument is to
establish a contrast between genuine deductive reasoning and moral or practical 
reasoning. On the conventional interpretation, this is done by showing that while the
conclusions o f  deductive reasoning are necessarily adopted, the conclusions of moral 
or practical reasoning are not. But recall that the argument appeals to a very general 
fact about causation— roughly, the fact that effects cannot be deductively inferred 
from their causes. If this fact establishes that the conclusions of practical 
reasoning— understood as ideas o f the reasoning’s conclusion, or motivations— do 
not necessarily ensue on the mental processes that would in normal circumstances 
produce them, it seems equally to establish that the conclusions of deductive 
reasoning— similarly understood as mental entities— do not necessarily follow  
either: i f  you believe p , and you believe p  3  q, you may be hit over the head before 
you get around to concluding q. So the argument, construed in this way, would, if  it 
worked in the case o f practical reasoning, work in the case o f deductive reasoning as 
well: it would have to establish that there really is no deductive reasoning either. 
Leaving to one side the intrinsic merits o f such an argument (it looks pretty bad), we 
may note that since its purpose was to establish a contrast between deductive and 
moral or practical reasoning, the argument, so construed, would fail by virtue of 
overkill. •
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these contents can be may constrain which deductive inferences are possible. 
Thus, for example, because Hume takes there to be a limit to the precision 
of one’s mental pictures, he is willing to conclude that Euclidean geometry 
is only approximately true. His semantic analysis of the contents of 
geometrical ideas constrains the consequences of admittedly deductive 
argument.37
Now consider an alleged inference from relations of objects to (something 
like) the appropriateness of an action. We must picture, first, the relevant 
relations of objects, and, second, the appropriateness of a particular action. 
(Call these picture, and picture2; we have already seen Hume’s argument that 
you are not going to be able to render picture,.) Now how is picture2 to depict 
the appropriateness of an action? How would a picture of an action differ 
from a picture of an action’s appropriateness? All the picture can do is depict 
the action’s being done. Therefore, the content of the ensuing judgment must 
be, that the action is done. (This, of course, is Hume’s opponents’ problem; 
not Hume’s. Hume can analyze appropriateness by adjoining to picture  ^ a 
non-representational feeling of (say) approval. This is because Hume is not 
committed to the feeling’s being deduced from picture,. But his opponents 
do not have this option; only pictures can be deduced from pictures by 
comparison of ideas.)38
On Hume’s general views about conceptual possibility and necessity, if 
picture2 is demonstrable or deducible from picture,, then what picture, 
depicts is necessitated by what picture, depicts.39 Since what picture2 will
37 T 26-65; esp. 45:4-7. It might be suggested that the arguments are not admittedly 
deductive, since Hume says that “with regard to such minute objects, they are not 
properly demonstrations” (45:1-3). This, however, is precisely the point: without 
ideas o f such objects, you cannot have deductions that take them as their subject; this 
is the way in which the scope of deductive argument is constrained by Hume’s 
semantic theories.
38 Two points need mentioning here. First, lacking an adequate treatment o f Hume’s 
understanding o f  deduction, I wish to leave open the question o f whether picture, 
and picture2 need in fact be different pictures. (A geometrical demonstration may 
start and finish with the same picture.) Second, recall that the ‘pictures’ need not be 
entirely visual; my idea of a heavy object may involve simple ideas derived from 
tactile rather than visual impressions. But this complication does not affect the 
present point.
39 For Hume’s view s on these matters, cf., e.g., T 18:22-28; 19:36-20:1; 29:11-14; 
32:17-23; 36:17-22; 40:26-28; 43:5-13; and esp. 29:3-6.
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depict is an action, Hume’s opponents, by virtue of their claim that morality 
is established deductively, are committed to the claim that action ensues 
necessarily on the occurrence of those relations of objects that make it 
appropriate. This makes Hume’s response— that there are no such necessary 
connections— reasonable.
Recall Hume’s unusual way of putting his standard fork, using the locution 
‘relations of objects’ instead of ‘relations of ideas’ .40 The relations of objects 
are mirrored by the relations of ideas that represent those objects. Deductions 
proceed from initial relations of ideas to further relations of ideas; these latter 
relations of ideas, however, mirror relations of objects: if the initial relations 
of ideas correctly mirrored the objects they represent, then so do the latter. 
Therefore, if from a representation of a situation it were possible to deduce a 
representation of a certain action occurring in that situation, this would show 
that in such a situation, that action would, necessarily, occur. This feature of 
deduction is not specific to Hume’s pictorial conception of it; the same holds 
for our propositional conception: if from a statement representing a given 
state of affairs it is possible to deduce a further statement that in that state of 
affairs some action will occur, this shows that in the actual state of affairs the 
action will, necessarily, occur.
Here is an illustration of the difficulty Hume takes his opponents’ views 
to have. (I am going to modify the one Hume gives; his illustrates both this 
argument and the one immediately preceding it, which makes it messy to 
untangle.) Consider what a deductive demonstration of the evil of parricide 
would have to look like. The premise of this deduction would be a 
representation of the relevant relations of objects. (For expository purposes, 
we can imagine this as, say, a picture of a father and his child. Of course, an 
idea capable of capturing the notion of parenthood would have to be 
complex in the extreme, and to the extent that it involved specifically causal 
notions would be partially non-representational for reasons that Hume 
discusses elsewhere. I propose to ignore these complications for the present.) 
The conclusion of the deduction would be a picture, the force of which 
would be that parricide is evil, or ought not to be done. How could a picture 
have this force? The closest we can come is a picture of someone doing what 
he ought, i.e., not murdering his father. So the conclusion of the 
demonstration would be, not that people ought not to murder their fathers,
40 See note 13, above.
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but that they do not murder their fathers. But whether people murder their 
fathers or not is a contingent matter, not amenable to being settled a priori.
Now that we have accounted for Hume’s emphasis on effects that are 
actions, we can fine-tune the view to accommodate effects and necessary 
conditions that are motivational as well. It might be suggested that for action 
to follow, the agent has to recognize that it is required: the agent must “know 
virtue” (T 465:28). Furthermore, the agent must have the right moral 
character: he must be “well-disposed” (34). And finally, what is required in 
some cases may be not actually action, but rather the attempt or the 
motivation: what can be morally required is only that the agent “conform the 
will,” that “in every well-disposed mind, [the connexion betwixt the relation 
and the will] must take place and have its influence” (28, 34f). We can now 
see that these qualifications, which Hume gracefully concedes, are irrelevant 
to the argument. If these are what morality requires, his deductivist 
opponents are committed to their necessarily occurring in the appropriate 
situation; but motivation and attempts, even on the part of well-disposed 
agents, are as contingent as action. We have now accounted for the passages 
that seemed to support the conventional reading of the argument.41
To recapitulate: Because deductive relations, pictorialiy understood, can 
hold only between contents that can be pictured, someone who claims that 
morality is deductive can at best mean that pictures of actions can be 
deduced from pictures of situations that (morally) require them. This would 
entail that (morally) appropriate actions necessarily occur in the situations 
that (morally) require them. The fact is they do not, at any rate, not
41 Two points: First, if Hume’s argument works even when the ‘effects’ are merely 
motivations, why the insistence that Hume takes the ‘effects’ to be action? Recall 
that ‘effects’ are whatever is required by the moral theory being examined. Even if 
many moral theories impose motivational requirements, and even if some impose 
only motivational requirements, most moral theories require actions. (What you 
ought to do, it is often thought, is not merely to mean not to kill your father, but 
actually not to kill him.) So it is important that Hume’s argument be effective against 
theories that require actions, and not merely motivations. Second, now that we have 
seen the argument, it might be thought that there is a further reason that the effects 
cannot be motivations: motivations cannot be represented either. (This would make 
it difficult to understand Hume’s subsequent insistence that motivations rather than 
actions are the appropriate object of moral judgment; cf., e.g., T 477:13-17.) But 
motivations can be represented. I can have impressions of reflection; and have ideas 
that are derived from them, resemble them, and consequently represent them.
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necessarily. Therefore, morality cannot be deductive. Moreover, since the 
argument was not morality-specific, it establishes more generally that 
deontic facts cannot be arrived at by deductive reasoning.42
It is well-known that pictorial theories of thought have difficulty 
accounting for what we think of as logical connectives, such as negation:43 
how is one to distinguish a picture of some state of affairs from a picture of 
its negation? What is important as regards the present point is that this 
difficulty extends to what we regard as modal and deontic operators. How is 
one to distinguish a picture of a state of affairs’ holding from a picture of its 
necessarily holding? How is one to distinguish a picture of a state of affairs’ 
holding from a picture of its being obligatory?44 It cannot be done using the 
representational elements of the picture. The easiest way to see this is to 
imagine trying to use a picture of a state of affairs to represent the necessity 
or obligatoriness of that state of affairs by modifying the representational 
elements of the picture— perhaps by scrawling “Necessary” or “Obligatory” 
across the top. The attempt is bound to fail: what one will get is not a picture 
of necessity, but a picture of, say, a landscape marred by peculiar skywriting. 
But if the representational elements of the picture cannot be used to 
distinguish obligation from fact, the remaining option is to adjoin to the 
picture a non-representational impression; and this is what Hume does.45
42 Understood in this way, Hume’s argument evades the overkill objection discussed 
earlier (note 36). When one idea is demonstrable from another, the holding of the 
state of affairs depicted by the latter does entail the holding of the state of affairs 
depicted by the former. Whenever you have an idea of two spots together with 
another two spots, you have an idea of four spots; and whenever you have two spots 
together with another two spots, you have four spots. Showing that moral (or, more 
generally, action-guiding) reasoning is not like this establishes a contrast with 
genuine deductive reasoning that is sufficient to show action-guiding reasoning to be 
non-deductive.
43 Cf. Harrison 1976, 30, 32f; Stroud 1977, 75. Stroud’s point is quite general, and 
is closely related to the central themes of this paper. But he fails to exploit it to 
elucidate the large body of Humean doctrine it bears upon.
44 This may be a difficulty for philosophers other than Hume who are committed to 
pictorial construals of content; perhaps the early Wittgenstein is an example of this. 
Cf. Hudson 1983, I07ff.
45 It is worth remarking that the territories covered by modem theories of content
and by Hume’s are only identical to a first approximation. Modem accounts of
necessity tend to be extensions of non-modal semantics, such as possible-world
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The passage generally read as claiming that ‘is’does not entail ‘ought’ (T 
469:19^70:4) is often considered to be a mere afterthought to the previous 
argument,46 a further independent but very brief argument presented as a 
rhetorical question: Hume professes not to understand transitions from ‘is’ 
to ‘ought’, and demands an explanation. We are now prepared to take a 
position on the force of that rhetorical demand.
If the passage is read on its own, it is extremely weak, just because no 
argument is presented. Hume’s opponent is likely to think he has an account 
(e.g., one that appeals to divine will, or fitness in relations of objects or ideas), 
and the mere rhetorical question will not (and should not) carry conviction.47
V
semantics. But Hume must rely on radically different tools (impressions of 
reflection) to reconstruct modal notions. So while we can think of a proposition with 
a modal operator in it as fully representational if we want to, Hume cannot. If only 
representational items come under the aegis of deductive inference, it will follow 
from this that necessity cannot be established by a priori deductive inference. It is, I 
think, useful to read certain of Hume’s arguments regarding induction and necessity 
with this in mind.
One worry that might be raised here is that Hume seems to be committed by this 
account to a view on which mathematical necessity will not be representable or 
expressible; but since he has been arguing that mathematical necessity will not 
account for obligation, it must be possible, somehow or other, to express the notion. 
An adequate treatment of this question would require a full-dress reconstruction of 
Hume’s understanding of deduction; here it suffices to note that Hume’s treatment 
of mathematical necessity can be expected to be continuous with his treatment of 
causal necessity and obligation: he writes that “the necessity, which makes two times 
two equal to four, or three angles of a triangle equal to two right ones, lies only in 
the act of the understanding, by which we consider and compare these ideas” (166:5—
10); and he does so in the course of drawing a comparison between mathematical 
necessity and causal necessity, the account of which we sketched in section 2 .
46 As for example Mackie 1980, 61, is inclined to: “the passage about ‘is’ and 
‘ought’... is plainly an afterthought for Hume himself.” Stroud 1977, 187, similarly 
states that “Hume apparently added it as something of an afterthought he hoped 
would be helpful.” And the view echoes at Harrison 1976, 69, who refers to the 
passage as an “argument, inserted almost as an afterthought.” On the other hand, 
Atkinson 1968, 274, regards it as a continuation of the previous argument, and 
Fogelin 1985, 138f, takes it to be a recapitulation of the argument at 463:17-468:20.
47 Harrison 1976, 69-82, summarizes a number of (generally modem) responses of 
this kind. Moreover, even if Hume’s opponent does not take himself to have such an
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I suggest that a better reading of the ‘is-ought’ passage would take it as a 
corollary to the previous argument; this is dictated by, at least, the principle 
of charity. By seeing just how the previous argument supports the claim we 
will be able to explain just what its force is supposed to be— on the 
assumption that the most reasonable interpretation is the one supported by 
the arguments Hume actually gives.
The arguments we have already seen are supposed to have established 
that judgments of obligation involve ideas whose contents derive, not from 
the situation that supposedly generates the obligation, but from the 
sentiments of the observer. Consequently, reasoning from a description of 
such a situation to such a judgment will involve the introduction of such a 
sentiment-derived idea. But reason is conservative, in that the conclusion of 
an inference can only contain elements contained in its premises; as Hume 
puts it elsewhere (describing it as one of two “very obvious principles”), 
“reason alone can never give rise to any original idea” (T 157:18-20). So one 
cannot arrive at ‘ought-judgments’ by reasoning about circumstances.
The point is this. Since the idea derived from the sentiment is ipso facto 
not derived from the situation being examined, it will not appear in a 
description of the situation. If the premises of an argument are the 
description of that situation, the idea needed in the argument’s conclusion 
will not appear in the premises, and, since reason is conservative, cannot 
figure in the argument’s conclusion.
The ‘is-ought’ passage can now be seen to be, not an afterthought, but an 
argument that relies on the conclusions of the immediately preceding 
arguments. And the force of its conclusion is just what it sounds like: ‘is’ 
does not entail ‘ought’. Specifically, you can’t start with a description of 
some situation and reason your way to claims about what, in that situation, 
ought to be the case.
The ‘is-ought’ passage does not itself invoke the considerations deriving 
from the causal resemblance theory of mental content, whose importance for 
the previous arguments I have been emphasizing. But it does invoke the
account, he may not concede that he has to shoulder the burden of proof: it is, he may 
suggest, no more reasonable to demand such an account of him than it is to demand 
an independent justification of the transition from a proposition universally 
quantified throughout to one containing proper names. The building blocks of 
practical reasoning, he may claim, are not to be expected to be amenable to any more 
justification than are other building blocks of reason.
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conclusions of arguments that do turn on those considerations, and so we 
should see the causal resemblance theory of mental content as underwriting 
Hume’s acceptance of the eponymous law, that “ ‘is’ does not entail 
‘ought.’ ” We are not yet fully equipped to assess the degree of this 
dependence, since we have surveyed only one of the three bodies of 
argument that lead up to the ‘is-ought’ passage; were the others to prove not 
to turn on causal resemblance considerations, it would be possible to 
surrender the causal resemblance theory and still have Hume-supplied 
reasons to accept Hume’s Law. I will not here anticipate the outcome of 
examining these other arguments.
VI
We have reconstructed a few of Hume’s arguments on the subject of 
practical reasoning, and found them to be a good deal better than 
commentators usually acknowledge them to be. We have also found them to 
rest, at least in part, on a body of semantic theory that is no longer acceptable 
today. What does this buy us? Well, first, it’s nice to know that Hume repays 
close reading; that, on examination, his arguments turn out to be tight and 
ingenious attempts to arrive at dramatic (if unlikely) conclusions, rather than 
boring, bad arguments for obviously true conclusions. Second, it may be 
worth rereading other arguments in the Treatise in light of these 
reconstructions; perhaps they too will turn out to be dependent on Hume’s 
semantic views in interesting ways. Third, as I suggested at the outset, this 
interpretation may have consequences for contemporary moral philosophy: I 
take it that the presumption that the burden of proof rests on opponents of 
Humean views about practical reasoning is in part due to the historical 
influence of the arguments we have been considering. But if this is right, 
finding these arguments to depend on a body of semantic theory that we no 
longer believe puts modem philosophers who believe Hume’s Law on the 
spot: they must be prepared to show that they have not merely inherited 
Hume’s Law, but that they can adduce good reasons for it. That “ ‘is’ does 
not entail ‘ought’ ” may, today, seem obvious; but if this obviousness is an 
effect of the arguments we have been examining, a defence of Hume’s Law 
should not appeal to its obviousness.
There is a fourth moral to draw from our discussion of Hume’s 
arguments. Consider the question of the penumbra of commitments
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surrounding the causal resemblance theory. The puzzle here is that several 
aspects of the causal resemblance theory do not seem to get anything like the 
amount of explicit consideration that they deserve, given their central role in 
Hume’s arguments. For example, while the pictorial view of deduction 
seems essential for reconstructing several of the arguments, the Treatise 
lacks the kind of discussion of pictorial deduction that we might hope for and 
think warranted by the uses to which the view is put. (While there is an 
extended discussion of geometry early on in the Treatise, this reads like an 
application of the view to a branch of mathematics, rather than a treatment 
of the view itself.) Or again, consider the argument discussed in section 4, 
against the deductivist view of morality. The argument turns on a very 
straightforward consideration: that the would-be conclusion of such an 
argument cannot be fully represented, and so cannot be the conclusion of a 
demonstration. So why doesn’t Hume simply say this?48 Now as a matter of 
fact, he does say something very much like this elsewhere; I take it that this 
is more or less the force of T 415:23-33 and 458:12-22. But even granting 
this, why does the later argument express such an uncomplicated 
consideration in such a convoluted manner?
What I think is happening is this. Much of the causal resemblance theory 
was, in Hume’s time, a widely held view (remember ‘the theory of ideas’); 
and Hume accordingly takes many of its commitments for granted. He does 
not feel that they need discussion, in roughly the way that a twentieth- 
century philosopher writing a treatise on mind or morality would be unlikely 
to feel that the propositional understanding of deduction needs discussion. 
And because of this, he does not see how much work these commitments are 
doing in his arguments. They are the platitudinous and frequently suppressed 
premises without which the argument does not make sense, but which are 
not worth spelling out for a contemporary and sophisticated audience. One 
doesn’t tend to think that the dialectical work is being done by one’s 
platitudinous premises, and so one frames one’s arguments so as to highlight 
the premises one takes to be substantive. However, from a distance of two 
hundred and fifty years or so, it is precisely the platitudinous and often 
suppressed premises that seem to be the hinges on which the arguments turn.
The moral, then, is that we should take very seriously the thought that we 
are in Hume’s position ourselves. Like Hume, we take for granted and rely
48 I’m grateful to Jaegwon Kim and Martha Nussbaum for pressing me on this point.
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on semantic theories; and the arguments we construct— whether for updated 
versions of Hume’s Law or for other claims— will tend to depend on those 
theories in ways that are not obvious to us. It is worth remembering how 
likely it is that, in two hundred and fifty years, our current semantic theories 
will appear merely quaint. For this reason it is worth taking special pains to 
avoid, where possible, having one’s arguments in moral philosophy depend 
on the apparatus supplied by contemporary philosophy of language.
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